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Remembering With and Without Awareness in a Depressed Mood:
Evidence of Deficits in Initiative
Paula T. Hertel and Tammy S. Hardin
Trinity University
We propose that depressive deficits in remembering

are

revealed in tasks that allow the sponta

neous use of strategies; tasks that bypass or direct the use of strategies should not produce
depressive deficits. College students received depressive- or neutral-mood inductions after an
swering questions worded to reflect homophones' less common meaning. After the inductions,
subjects spelled old and new homophones and showed no effect of the depressive inductions on
unaware memory for the old homophones. Subsequent tests of recognition did, however, reveal
differences according to the induced mood or the presence of naturally occurring depression (in
Experiment 3). The differences, evidence of nondepressed subjects'

use

of strategies, tended to

disappear when all subjects were provided with strategies for spelling or recognition. The results
indicate that depressives experience deficits in cognitive initiative. We review the literature on
depressive memory from this perspective.

Problems with memory are typical of depression, so much

subjects, as well as the performance of the nondepressed

so that they are included among diagnostic criteria for depres

subjects who do not spontaneously elect them, to comparable

sion (see Spitzer, Endicott, & Robins, 1978). Yet a review of

levels.

the literature on depressed people's performance in memory

from their use (by concealing the nature of the task, for

tasks does not reveal consistent findings for depressive deficits.

example) can lower the performance of depressed and non

Bypassing the use of strategies in tasks that benefit

How can this inconsistency be understood? We propose that

depressed subjects to comparable levels by affecting the non

depression inhibits cognitive initiative. Depressed persons do

depressed subjects more than the depressed subjects.

not spontaneously use strategies or engage in the types of

We think that this account pertains to a number of findings

elaborative thinking that produce good performance in typical

on deficits from natural and induced depression. Selected
examples of research on deficits produced by mood inductions

memory tasks, but they are capable of doing so when they are
directed.

and deficits observed in naturally depressed individuals are

We identify three categories of conditions for the use of
strategies that benefit performance in memory tasks: sponta

reviewed in the general discussion. At this point, however, to

neous, directed, or bypassed. The spontaneous use of strategies

ory, we compare the initiative account with the resource

occurs when processing is not well controlled by the design of

allocation hypothesis (see Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988; Hasher &
Zacks, 1979).

clarify our notion of the role of initiative in depressive mem

the task. It happens when subjects organize without direction,
for example, or when they notice relations to extratask knowl

A number of researchers have proposed that deficits in

edge, or when they simply continue to rehearse when they are
not required to do. According to our account of depressive

remembering are due to a reduction in cognitive capacity in
college students who experience mood induction (e.g., Ellis,

deficits, deficits will occur when subjects can spontaneously

Thomas, & Rodriguez, 1984), in college students who report

Directing the

depression (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1979), and in patients who

elect strategies that are not specified in the task.

experience minor or major depression (e.g., Roy-Byrne, Wein

use of strategies can raise the performance of the depressed

gartner, Bierer, Thompson, & Post, 1986). This view is derived
from the assumption that there is a limit on the amount of
resources available for performing mental operations (e.g.,

Experiment I was conducted by Tammy S. Hardin in partial

James, 1890; Kahneman, 1973) and holds that depression

fulfillment of requirements for University Honors at Trinity Univer

either occupies or reduces those available resources (e.g., Beck,

sity. Leslie Heinberg conducted Experiment 3 for her Senior Thesis.
Alada Caughey and Jay Newberry served as experimenters in Exper

1967). Furthermore, characteristics of events vary according

iments 2 and 3. Portions of the research were described at the meeting

to the amount of resources that they typically demand during

of the Psychonomic Society in Seattle, November 1987.

processing. Hasher and Zacks, for example, proposed that

We thank Henry Ellis and Ronald Kinchla for reviews of an earlier

both spatiotemporal and overlearned information typically

version of this article and Steve Tucker for allocating Dean's Discre

are processed automatically, which places little or no demand

tionary Funds to the completion of Experiment 3. Larry Jacoby and

on available resources, but that the use of such learning
strategies as organization, elaboration, and mnemonic devices

Colleen Kelley provided helpful comments during early stages of the
research. Paula T. Hertel also thanks Ian Begg, Lee Brooks, and Larry

demands effortful processing. Tasks that involve such strate

Jacoby for their intellectual hospitality while she was on sabbatical

gies, in contrast to more automatic processes, typically pro
duce superior performance on subsequent tests of remember

leave at McMaster University, Ontario, Canada.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to

ing (see Craik & Jacoby, 1979). Hence depressed individuals
show decrements in remembering the materials from effortful

Paula T. Hertel, Department of Psychology, Trinity University, 715
Stadium Drive, San Antonio, Texas 78284.
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processing tasks, as a result of their reduced capacity to

should be lumped together with respect to the type of proc

perform such operations, but do not show decrements in

essing that they incur. Some of these tests (e.g., word comple

remembering materials from tasks that depend on more au

tion clarification) produce performance that is correlated with

tomatic processes. They fail to show the memorial benefit of

performance on analytic tests such as recognition or recall.

effortful processing that is obtained with nondepressed sub

Certainly, the proper focus belongs on an examination of the

jects (see Tyler, Hertel, McCallum, & Ellis, 1979).
A critical issue, then, is whether depression limits the

processes involved.

ability

In the following three experiments, we used retrieval tasks

to use effortful operations or whether, instead, it reduces the

that reportedly are accomplished with and without awareness

use is not

of remembering. In Experiment 1 we demonstrated a depres

initiative to use beneficial strategies when their

demanded by the task. The view just described implies that

sive deficit in remembering with awareness during a recogni

depressed individuals lack the ability to process effortfully

tion task but no deficit on the test of remembering without

because resources are allocated to "depressive schemata" or

awareness. (We examine issues related to awareness of remem

because resources are limited in some other fashion (such as

bering on that test.) In Experiments 2 and 3, we provided

altered functions of biogenic amines; Baldessarini, 1981;

strategies for performing each task and expected no depres

Henry, Weingartner, & Murphy, 1973). If depressed subjects

sion-related differences in performance.

can allocate resources and perform as well as nondepressed

In all three experiments, we used mood-induction proce

subjects on effortful but well-structured tasks, then the utility

dures on nondepressed college students; the third experiment

of a focus on cognitive effort should be limited to the stage of

also included a group of naturally depressed students. We are

initiating such effortful processing.
Our focus on initiative highlights variations in the con

not aware of any attempts to compare directly the perform
ances.of subjects with induced depression and naturally de

straints imposed by cognitive tasks. Tasks vary in the degree

pressed subjects on memory tasks. Such a comparison is

to which they constrain the type and amount of processing,

critical for an understanding of the research on depressive

in such a way that uninstructed strategies may be elected

deficits because there are reasons to suspect that mood induc

spontaneously in some tasks and reduced or prevented by the

tions do not produce a state that is similar to naturally

constraints of other tasks. Nondepressed subjects frequently
go beyond the requirements of loosely constrained tasks, but

occurring depression. Students who undergo mood-induction
procedures descr ibe their feelings differently. Some say that

depressed subjects may fail to initiate similar operations that

they feel lethargic but not really depressed. Lethargy, of

are not required. Whether a depressive impairment in initia

course, is not clinically comparable with depression, although

tive is strictly motivational in nature (see Abramson, Metal

the two states may produce similar effects on cognitive tasks.

sky, & Alloy, 1989) or involves metacognitive deficits is a

If inductions do produce states comparable with clinical

topic for further research. Our concern is simply to delineate

depression, subjects with induced depression may nevertheless

the phenomenon and relate it to previous research on depres

perform quite differently than naturally depressed subjects;
the latter may have developed methods for adjusting to their

sion and memory.
Our emphasis in this report is placed on varying the degree

depression, whereas the former have experienced a very recent

of initiative that is induced by retrieval tasks (see Hertel &

change in mood state and would have no particular motiva

Rude, 1989, for a discussion of initiative during acquisition).
If depressed persons experience deficits in processing initia

may differ in their effects because attention to depressive

tion for such coping strategies. Alternatively, the two states

tive, they should perform poorly in retrieval tasks that are

musings characterizes natural depression and not the more

sensitive to such initiative. Initiative is encouraged by tasks

transient mood. Clearly, a direct comparison of these two

that require judgments of prior occurrence, such as recogni

potentially different mood-related states is required.

tion, because such judgments can occur on a variety of bases
ranging from feelings of familiarity (a very simple strategy, if
one at all) to the use of complex reasoning. In contrast, the
role of initiative is minimized in tasks that provide a useful
strategy for judgments of prior occurrence. Consequently,
depressive deficits should be minimized in such tasks.

Experiment I
Apart from our manipulations and measures of mood, the
procedures of Experiment 1 conformed to those used by
Jacoby and Witherspoon ( 1982). The spelling of homophones

Depressive deficits should also decrease in retrieval tasks

(words that sound the same but have different spellings and

that bypass judgments of prior occurrence by being repre
sented as something other than a test of memory. The class

meanings) served as their test of memory without awareness.
In the first phase of their experiments, subjects were asked a

of retrieval tasks that appear to bypass explicit attempts to

series of questions. Homophones contained in some of the

remember is referred to as tests of remembering without
awareness (Jacoby & Witherspoon, 1982), nonanalytic mem

questions served as targets for the subsequent memory tests,
and the questions were worded to reflect the homophones'

ory (Jacoby & Brooks, 1984), and implicit memory (Graf &
Schacter, 1985). These tasks index memory for prior exposure
to materials without subjects' awareness that their memory is
are

less common meaning (i.e., "What color is a

pear?"). The

questions were read aloud by the experimenter, and the
subjects responded in kind. In Phase 2 the experimenter read

to the materials on the test. Recently, Perruchet and Baveux

aloud nonhomophones and homophones, some of which were
targets and the rest of which were distractors, and asked
subjects to spell them. Spelling targets (vs. distractors) in the

( 1989) questioned the assumption that nonanalytic tests

less common way indexed memory for the question phase.

being tested. They

nonanalytic tests of memory because

the subjects do not analyze the occurrence of prior exposure
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The spelling test was followed by a recognition test. Both

credit and met the criterion of scoring less than 6 on the BDl. All

normal and amnesic subjects showed the effect of prior ex

subjects were tested individually and were randomly assigned to one

posure by spelling more targets than distractors in the less
common way, but amnesic subjects experienced the usual
deficit in recognition. By using similar procedures, we ex
pected to show a depressive deficit in recognition but not in

of the following conditions of the VMIP, with the constraint of equal
ns: neutral study and neutral testing, neutral study and depressed
testing, depressed study and neutral testing, and depressed study and
depressed testing.

performance on the spelling test.
In Experiment 1, mood was manipulated through the Vel
ten Mood Induction Procedure (VMIP; Velten, 1968) before
the question phase and then again before the tests of memory.
The latter manipulation was our main concern; however,
evidence for mood dependency in tests of memory with
awareness (see Blaney, 1986) encouraged us to include the
former manipulation as well. (If we had not included the first
manipulation, a depressive deficit in spelling or recognition
could result from a change in mood between study and test
in the depressive condition and not in the neutral condition.)

Materials
Homophones and questions.

For the study phase, the 32 homo

phones used by Eich (1984) were equally divided into two lists, A
and B. The median frequency (KuCera & Francis, 1967) for the
homophones in each list was I I (in comparison with 44 and 40 for
the alternate spellings of the homophones in Lists A and B, respec

(Kreuz, 1987) were
493 and 473 for the homophones in Lists A and B, respectively (in
comparison with 600 and 556 for their alternate spellings).'
tively). Median ratings of subjective familiarity

We did not expect to find overall differences in spelling as

The homophones from List A or B were presented to subjects in

a function of mood during the question phase. Because tests

the context of questions (e.g., "What color is a pear?"). These 16

of memory without awareness seem unaffected by variations

questions were worded to reflect the less common meaning of the

in the degree of analysis during prior exposure (see Jacoby &

homophones. Eight additional questions containing no homophones

Dallas, 198 1), any spontaneous use of strategies during ques
tioning should not affect performance of the spelling test. In
contrast, differences in recognition might occur as a function
of mood during the question phase. Such differences would
suggest that neutral subjects did something in addition to
answering the questions that would make the targets more
memorable.

were used as fillers in order to disguise the nature of the targeted
words. The questions for each list were arranged in three orders. The
first order was random, except that the first and last questions were
fillers. To obtain the other two orders, blocks of eight questions, as
well as the questions within each block, were rotated, but the first
and last questions again were fillers.

Spelling lists.

To construct the spelling lists, the homophones in

each list of questions were divided into two lists of 8 each. Then 8
homophones from each list of questions were placed on one spelling

Method
Overview
Choosing not to induce further depression in students with that
tendency, we selected subjects who scored less than 6 on the Beck
Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Er
baugh, 1961 ). Before the study phase, we induced a depressed or a
neutral mood by using the VMIP and checked the manipulation with
the Depression Adjective Check List (DACL; Lubin, 1965). The study
phase consisted of 24 questions, read aloud. Embedded in 16 of the
questions were targeted homophones; the questions were worded to
reflect their less common meaning. Then the second mood induction
was delivered; half of the previously neutral subjects and half of the
previously depressed subjects were induced to feel depressed, whereas
the other halves were placed in a neutral mood. In the subsequent
spelling test, the experimenter read 32 words aloud (8 targeted hom
ophones, 8 new homophones, and 16 nonhomophones) and asked
subjects to give the first spelling that came to mind. Yes/no recogni
tion followed, and 64 words were read aloud (the 16 targeted homo
phones, the 8 new homophones on the spelling test, 8 new homo

list, along with 16 nonhomophones; the remaining 8 homophones
from each list and the same 16 nonhomophones constituted the other
spelling list. The two spelling lists, then, each contained 8 targeted
homophones, 8 new homophones as distractors, and 16 nonhomo
phones. On each spelling list the words were arranged so that each
block of four words contained one target, one distractor, and two
nonhomophones; the order within blocks was rotated across blocks.
Across subjects, each homophone occurred equally often as a target
and as a distractor.
The spelling lists were counterbalanced with the question lists, so
that 3 subjects in each condition of mood induction were assigned to
each of the four combinations of question and spelling lists. (Each of
these 3 subjects heard the questions in a different order.)

Recognition list.

A total of 64 words appeared on the recognition

test: all 16 targets (8 spelled and 8 not spelled), 16 distractors (8
spelled and 8 not spelled), and 32 nonhomophones (the 16 on the
spelling tests and 16 new homophones). The words were arranged in
blocks of 16. Each block contained 4 targets, 4 distractors, 4 spelled
nonhomophones, and 4 new nonhomophones, arranged randomly;
the targets and distractors in each block all had been on the spelling
test or unspelled, depending on which spelling list the subject had

phones occurring for the first time, and 32 nonhomophones). The
experimenter asked the subjects to tell her whether they remembered
hearing each word in the questions she had asked earlier. A second
check on the manipulation of mood was then performed. Last, we
induced elation in those who had been subjected to a previous
induction of depression.

1

The medians for frequency and familiarity were computed after

we conducted the experiment. In so doing, we discovered that four
of the homophones on each list were presented in their more frequent
or common form, according to the norms that we used. In the
remainder of this report we assert that the questions biased the less
common spelling of the homophones, but the reader should keep in

Subjects and Design
Forty-eight subjects recruited from lower division psychology
courses at Trinity University participated in exchange for course

mind that this assertion was not uniformly valid for Experiments I
and 2. Nevertheless, no confound was introduced, given that the
same homophones served as both targets and distractors in spelling
and recognition.
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heard. Spelled and unspelled homophones rotated across the four
blocks.

Results and Discussion
Interesting consequences of the mood induction before

Procedure
The subjects first completed the BDl. Those whose scores were
greater than 5 were dismissed, and the remaining subjects underwent
the VMIP. In this procedure for inducing moods, the subjects read
30 neutral or 30 depressive statements while seated alone in the
testing room. Neutral statements were factual (e.g., "There are 26
breeds of cats"), whereas depressive statements were self-referential
(e.g., "I am feeling sad today"). A tape recorder played beeps at a
30-s rate. Subjects were instructed to read each statement aloud and
then silently until the beep occurred to signal the reading of the
statement on the next page. The instructions encouraged all subjects
to think only about the statement during its reading and experience
it as true, but subjects in the depressive condition were also encour
aged to be receptive to the mood described by the statement. (These
are standard instructions for the VMIP.) After the mood induction,
the subjects completed the DACL as a check on the manipulation.
The DACL contains 32 adjectives that describe emotionally positive
and negative states, and subjects are instructed to check the ones that
describe their current feelings.
The first mood induction and manipulation check was followed
by the study phase. The experimenter read the list of 24 questions
aloud, and the subjects answered in kind. Subjects then received the
second mood induction. Those who had previously read the set of
neutral statements now read either a second set of 30 neutral state
ments or a set of 30 depressive statements. But the subjects who had
previously read depressive statements were treated differently: In
order to counteract the original depressive induction, subjects passing
into the neutral condition read 15 neutral statements and 15 elated
statements; in order to maintain rather than increase a depressive
state, subjects passing into a second depressive induction read 15
neutral and 15 depressive statements. In these sets of combined
statements, the nature of the statement alternated.
The spelling test was administered immediately after the second
induction. The experimenter said, "I am going to read some words
to you and I want you to spell them for me. I want you to give me
the first spelling that comes to mind." She paced the reading at a
rapid rate and, if subjects paused, reminded them to spell quickly.
Subjects spelled aloud, and the experimenter recorded the nature of
the spellings (in line with the question's context or the alternate
meaning).
Instructions for the subsequent recognition test were as follows:

testing were obtained, and they offer support for the proposal
that the depressed students experienced deficits in processing
initiative during the retrieval tasks. Howev�r, the results failed
to show evidence of mood dependency (see Blaney, 1986, for
a review that emphasized the many failures to find mood
dependent memory), although the manipulation of mood was
confirmed by scores on the DACL (see the following section).
The results also failed to show effects of the mood induction
before the question phase on the subsequent spelling

and

recognition tests. The question task seemed to have encour
aged similar degrees and types of processing by neutral and
depressed subjects.
In the reports of analyses performed on spelling and rec
ognition, we ignore the factor for the first mood induction,
although the factor was included in those analyses, along with
a between-subjects factor for mood at testing and a within
subjects factor appropriate to the measure of memory (i.e.,
prior exposure-target vs. distractor-for analyses of spelling
performance, and the spelling status of the homophone for
analyses of recognition). For all analyses, the significance level
was set at .05.

Mood Indices
Scores on the BDI did not differ reliably according to
conditions of mood during study or testing (means ranged
from 1.92 to 2.83). Scores on the first administration of the
DACL were analyzed with mood during study as a factor.
The mean score was 8.08 for subjects in the neutral condition
and 15.25 for those in the depressed condition; the difference
was reliable, F( 1, 46) = 30.61,

MS.= 20. 138. Scores on the

second administration were analyzed with factors for mood
during study and mood during testing. Only the main effect
of mood during testing was reliable (7.42 for neutral condition
vs. 12.08 for depressed condition), F(1, 44) = 16.82,

MS. =

15.534.
Spelling
The effect of prior exposure to homophones on the spelling

I am going to read some words to you and I want you to tell me
if you remember hearing those words in the questions I asked
you earlier-not in the statements that you read or in the spelling
test, only in the questions I asked you earlier. Please respond yes
or no. I also want you to rate your confidence in your decision
on a scale of I to 5, with 5 being the most confident.

test (proportion of targets spelled in the less common way, in
comparison with the proportion of distractors) served as a
measure of memory without awareness. The spelling test
indexed similar performance by neutral and depressed sub
jects. The mean proportion of targets spelled in line with the
questions (the less common way) in

The list of 64 words was then read, and the subjects responded orally.
After the recognition task, subjects completed a second DACL as
a check for the second manipulation of mood. Before their debriefing,
the subjects who had been induced to feel depressed read 30 elated
statements from the VMIP. These subjects were also interviewed
carefully in order to ensure that they left the experiment in a nonde
pressed state. During debriefing for all subjects, the experimenter
asked questions that were designed to reveal their subjective experi
ences during spelling. Specifically, she attempted to discover whether
any subjects viewed the spelling test as a test of memory for words in
the previous questions.

each condition was .4 1,

which was significantly larger than the mean proportion of
distractors that were spelled in the less common way (.34 for
neutral mood and .26 for depressed mood), F(l, 44) = 9.54,

MS. = 0.029. (The difference for distractors alone was not
reliable at . 10, nor was the interaction of prior exposure with
mood during testing.) In interviews at the end of the experi
ment, all subjects reported a lack of awareness of the spelling
test as a measure of memory for words in the list of questions.
According to these self-reports, if they did notice a relation
between the questions and the spelling words, they neverthe-
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less gave the first spelling that came to mind. They did not
attempt to spell in line with the questions, probably because
the experimenter stressed immediate responding in the spell
ing task.
Recognition

In recognition, strategies can be elected. One strategy would
be to consult the status of the word on the previous spelling
test-to use spelling as a means of gaining access to the
question. Depressed subjects' performance was not correlated
with how the word had been spelled or with whether it had
been spelled (see Table 1, top half). Recognition was inde
pendent of spelling. In contrast, neutral subjects were more
likely to report recognition if they had spelled the word in
line with the questions (biased) than if they had used the more
common spelling (unbiased) or had not spelled it.
These conclusions are based on an examination of the
proportion of affirmative responses conditionalized on the
spelling status of the targets (spelled in line with the questions,
spelled in the unbiased way, or not spelled).2 The interaction
of mood during testing (neutral or depressed) with spelling
status was reliable, F(2, 88) = 4.04, MS. = 0.056. When
neutral subjects had spelled targets in line with the questions,
they benefited on the later test of recognition. The mean
proportion of hits was .70 for neutral subjects, in comparison
with .52 for depressed subjects, F(I, 44) = 4.74, MS.= 0.078.
Both gamma and phi coefficients were also computed to
represent the association between spelling and recognition
performance by each subject. The analysis of gamma showed
a marginally reliable effect of mood at testing (Ms = .33 for
neutral mood and -.03 for depressed mood), F(1, 44) = 3.26,
MS.= 0.468, p < .08. The effect was reliable for phi (.22 vs.
-.04), F(l, 44) = 6.42, MS.= 0. 122.
Neutral subjects showed evidence of correlated perform
ance on spelling and recognition, perhaps because they no
ticed the connection between the spelling words and the
questions during the spelling task. In other words, perhaps
spelling did not constitute a test of remembering without
awareness. However, if they did notice such a relation during
the spelling task, they did not make use of that knowledge in
spelling the homophones; their spelling performance was
comparable with the performance by subjects with induced
depression. Nevertheless, noticing the relation could consti
tute a practice trial in recognition memory. In line with this
possibility is the finding that homophones spelled in the more
Table 1

Mean Proportion ofHits Conditionalized on Spelling Status:
Experiments 1 and 2
Spelling status
Testing mood
Experiment I
Neutral
Depressed
Experiment 2
Neutral
Depressed

n

Biased

Unbiased

Unspelled

24
24

.70
.52

.48
.58

.59
.56

12
12

.84
.80

.40

.36

.65
.56

common way by neutral subjects were less likely to be recog
nized than were unspelled homophones. In Experiment 2 we
told subjects to consider words from the questions while
spelling, so that we could determine whether depressed sub
jects can profit from such a strategy.
Another account of the neutral subjects' superior recogni
tion of targets that were spelled in line with the questions is
that they used a strategy for consulting their previous spelling
performance when making recognition judgments. As we
suggested earlier, one way to recognize homophones-if one
has noticed that some of the words on the recognition task
had been spelled-is to recall how the homophone was
spelled. Recalling accurately could provide the best route for
retrieving the question context and thereby recognizing the
homophone from the study phase. In Experiment 3 we in
structed some subjects to check back to their spelling perform
ance as a step in arriving at the recognition decision, and we
predicted that the depressed subjects would perform as well
as the neutral subjects when they were so instructed.
Experiment 1, however, provided some evidence that neu
tral subjects spontaneously consulted their spelling perform
ance on the recognition test more frequently than did the
depressed subjects. The neutral subjects made more frequent
false alarms in response to homophonic distractors that had
been spelled (mean proportion = . 19) than to those that had
not been on the spelling test (.08). Depressed subjects did not
show such a difference in false alarms (.09 for spelled vs. . 1 1
for unspelled). The interaction of mood during testing with
the spelling status of the distractors was reliable, F( 1, 44) =
6.30, MS.= 0.019.
Experiment 2
One purpose of Experiment 2 was to determine whether
performance by neutral subjects and subjects with induced
depression alike can benefit from a strategy for spelling hom
ophones. All subjects were instructed to notice the relation
between words on the spelling test and words in the questions.
Again, we expected depressed subjects to perform without a
deficit and spell at levels comparable with those by nonde
pressed subjects. It seemed that both types of subjects would
notice relations on the basis of familiarity because they had
little time for more analytic attempts to recognize homo
phones on the basis of retrieving questions.
Our more central aim, however, was to see whether provid
ing depressed subjects with a strategy for spelling would help
them on the subsequent test of recognition. In effect, the
spelling test can serve as a second processing trial for homo
phones in the questions, particularly if the relation between
the two tasks is observed. Knowing about the relation between
the spelling and questioning phases should provide useful
information for making recognition decisions.
Another change from the procedures of Experiment 1 con
cerned inductions of depressed moods. Because we failed to
find evidence for effects of mood during study in Experiment

2

Analyses of confidence ratings revealed effects that were very

similar to the ones that we report here.
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1, inductions were delivered in this experiment at the end of

.66 for neutral subjects and .78 for depressed subjects (the

the question phase only. We wished to submit a conservative

difference was not reliable). Averaged phi coefficients were

number of subjects to an induction of a depressive mood.

.40 for neutral subjects and .45 for depressed subjects.
Last, the false alarm rates, which were highest for homo
phones spelled by neutral subjects in Experiment 1, did not

Method

differ according to mood in Experiment 2. False alarms in

Twenty-four students from lower division psychology courses at

response to the homophones from the spelling test, however,

Trinity University volunteered in exchange for credit and met the

tended to be more frequent than false alarms for new distrac

criterion for mood inductions (BDI score < 6). With the constraint
of equal ns, they were randomly assigned to receive either a neutral
or a depressive induction, and within those conditions they were
assigned in equal numbers to the question and spelling lists. The
materials and procedures from Experiment 1 were used, with three
exceptions: (a) The first mood induction and the first DACL were
omitted, (b) confidence ratings were excluded from the procedure for
recognition, and (c) instructions for the spelling test were changed to

tors (12% vs. 7%), although the difference was not reliable.
In summary, the mood-induced deficits of Experiment 1
disappeared in Experiment 2 when all subjects were instructed
to notice relations that neutral subjects might have detected
on their own analysis and through their own initiative. Both
groups were more likely to recognize the targets that they had
spelled in line with the questions than the other targets.

"I am going to read some words to you and I want you to spell them

Experiment 3

for me. You may find that thinking back to the questions will help
you to spell the words."

In this experiment we directed some subjects to use a
strategy

Results and Discussion

during recognition,

whereas other subjects followed

our previous instructions. We expected to show depressive
deficits in the undirected condition only. Subjects in the
directed condition followed a series of steps in making their

Mood Indices
Scores on the DACL were higher for the subjects with
induced depression than for the neutral subjects (13.33 vs.

9.58), although the difference was only marginally reliable,
F(1, 22)
3.16, MSe
26.708, p < .10. The mean scores on
the BDI were roughly comparable (1.67 for depressed subjects
=

=

and 2.25 for neutral subjects; p > .40).

recognition judgments. They were directed (a) to judge
whether the word had been on the spelling test, (b) to report
how they had spelled it or how they would have spelled it if
it had been on the spelling test, (c) to decide whether the word
had been part of a question, and (d) to identify the question.
We reasoned that if subjects used these procedures for recog
nition, they would most likely recognize words that they
spelled in the biased way on the spelling test or on the directed
test of recognition, or on both, and least likely recognize

Spelling

words that they spelled in the unbiased way. If the spelling

Again, no reliable differences according to mood induction

test provided a rehearsal trial, as it seemed to do according to

were obtained in spelling performance. Only the effect of

the results of the first two experiments, this strategy for

prior exposure was reliable, F(1, 22)

24.77, MSe
0.034.
Depressed subjects spelled 54% of targets and 29% of distrac

recognition should affect performance regardless of mood,

tors in the less common way, whereas the comparable per

neutral condition, we hypothesized, might use such a strategy

centages for neutral subjects were 56 and 28, respectively. But

on their own initiative.

=

=

but particularly for depressed subjects. Some subjects in the

levels of remembering were higher than in Experiment 1 (a

Under each condition of the recognition task, we added a

.27 difference between targets and distractors in Experiment
2, in comparison with .11 in Experiment 1). Providing a

group of subjects who reported moderate to severe depression
on the BDI, so that we could directly compare the conditions

strategy for spelling made the spelling test a test of memory

for obtaining deficits under naturally occurring depression to

with awareness and appeared to elevate the performance of

those for obtaining deficits from mood inductions. Mood

neutral and depressed subjects.

induction procedures produce transient mood states, and the

Recognition

However, their effects on memory should be compared with

effects of transient moods are interesting in their own right.
the memorial concomitants of natural depression, so that the

In the last two rows of Table 1 we present the results of
recognition conditionalized on the spelling status of the tar

diverse findings from mood-related memory investigations
can be understood.

gets. The proportion of affirmative responses in both condi

The focus of most research involving mood-induction pro

tions of mood depended on spelling performance, as indicated

cedures has been on mood congruency-the compatibility

by a reliable main effect of the spelling status, F(2, 44)

between the nature of the mood and the nature of the mate

=

0.041. Effects involving mood were not reliable.
Neutral subjects recognized 84% of the homophones that they
had spelled in line with the question, 40% of those that they
spelled in the unbiased way, and 65% of those that they had
28.39, MSe

=

rials to be recalled (see reviews by Blaney, 1986; Johnson &
Magaro, 1987). Overall deficits (regardless of congruency) are
sometimes found and sometimes not, but the emotional
nature of the materials presents a complex puzzle. In Experi

not spelled; the corresponding percentages for depressed sub

ments 1 and 2, some meanings of some homophones were

jects were 80, 36, and 56. Averaged gamma coefficients were

emotional in nature. When we performed analyses of data

DEPRESSIVE MEMORY

that excluded these emotional homophones, we obtained the
same pattern of results that we report here, probably because
the questions that provided their context were not emotional.
However, on the grounds of simplicity, we selected emotion
ally neutral words for Experiment 3.3 We also designed the
materials in ways that would allow us to examine the r�cog
nition of nonhomophones.
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Subjects and Design
A total of 9 1 students at Trinity University participated in exchange
for credit in their lower division psychology courses. They were
selected for participation by the following method: BDis were distrib
uted to lower division psychology classes, in which students were
asked to fill them out anonymously and return them in sealed
envelopes, along with a signed consent form. Paula Hertel scored the
BDis, recorded the scores for later

use,

and constructed lists of

nondepressed and depressed students (BDI scores < 6 and

>

9,

respectively). Experimenters scheduled these students for participa

Method

tion in the experiment.
Under constraints of equal ns, initially nondepressed subjects were
randomly assigned to receive a combination of mood induction

Materials

(neutral vs. depressed), recognition task (directed vs. undirected),
question list (List A or List B), and spelling list (List 1 or List 2).

Homophones were chosen from a list compiled by Kreuz ( 1987)
and submitted to an independent group of 20 subjects for ratings of
emotionality. Subjects rated both meanings of the homophones, as
well as nonhomophones, on a scale of 1 (not at all emotional) to 7

(extremely emotional). On the basis of minimizing the median ratings
of emotionality, 24 homophones were selected for use in the experi
ment. They were divided into four lists of 6 homophones each. We
made assignments to lists by attempting to equate the lists on the
following eight indices: median emotional values for both the less
common and the more common spelling; median frequencies (see
Kueera & Francis, 1967) for both spellings, plus the difference in
frequency between the two; and median familiarities (see Kreuz,

1 987) of both spellings, plus the difference in familiarity between the
two. The range of median emotional values across lists and spellings
was 1 . 1 8- 1 . 7 1 . Median differences ranged from 52 to 62 for frequen
cies and from 83 to 109 for familiarity ratings.
Twenty-four nonhomophones were chosen on the basis of emo
tional ratings and number of letters that were similar to those of
the 24 homophones. Their median frequency of 30 fell between
the frequencies for the less common spelling of the homophones

10) and the more common spelling (Mdn
49). We also
divided the nonhomophones into four lists of 6 each by attempting

(Mdn

=

=

to equate the lists on median emotional ratings (which ranged from

1 .48 to 1 .88) and median frequencies (26 to 34).
Two lists of homophones and two lists of nonhomophones were
combined to comprise the words for each list of questions (Question
Lists A and B). Then, one list of 6 homophones and one list of 6
nonhomophones from each question list were combined to form
Spelling List I; the other 12 words from each question list formed
Spelling List 2. Last, all 48 words appeared on the recognition list,
together with 12 fillers that were chosen for their analogous frequen
cies, emotional ratings, and numbers of letters.
Nonhomophones appeared in the first two and last two questions
on each question list; other words were randomly assigned to Ques
tions 3-22, but no more than two homophones were allowed to occur
consecutively. As in previous experiments, the questions were worded
to reflect their less common meaning. Each block of eight words on
the spelling lists contained two homophones and two nonhomo
phones from Question List A and two of each type from Question
List B; within blocks the words were randomly arranged with the

Initially depressed subjects all received the neutral-mood induction
and were randomly assigned to receive combinations of the other
factors.
The BDI was administered again during the experimental session.
An average of 1 3 days intervened between the first and second
administrations of the BDI ( 14 days for depressed subjects alone).
These procedures conformed to those suggested by Deardorff and
Funabiki ( 1 985) to ensure stability in depressed groups. They also
served as a safeguard for the nondepressed subjects who would
undergo induction procedures. Initially nondepressed subjects filled
out the second BDI at the beginning of the experimental session, and
those who scored higher than 5 were dismissed. Initially depressed
subjects filled out the second BDI at the end of the experimental
session, along with a form that was designed to rule out those with
depressionlike symptoms due to illness, drug use, or sudden catastro
phe (ROC form). The form was developed by S. Rude to reflect
research diagnostic criteria (ROC) for minor or major depression (see
Spitzer et al., 1978). Depressed subjects placed the forms in an
envelope marked with their subject number and delivered them to
the psychology department office. They were led to believe that these
forms were part of a separate study. We used such deception because
we suspected that depressed students might minimize their depression
in the presence of a peer who was the experimenter. Again, only
Hertel had access to these forms.
The data from 12 initially depressed students were eliminated from
analyses and subsequently replaced because they did not meet our
final criteria for natural depression (BDI score

>

9 on both adminis

trations and ROC). Of these 12 subjects, 3 failed to tum in their
second BDI and interview form at the end of the session, 5 scored
less than 9 on the second BDI, and 4 did not meet ROC.
Stringency for selecting naturally depressed subjects suggested that
we use some criterion beyond the BDI for including neutral subjects
and subjects with induced depression. The DACL is usually used as
a ·check on the mood manipulation, but in this experiment we used
it to ensure that our neutral subjects were not feeling bad and that
our subjects with induced depression were not in a good mood. As a
result, the data from 7 initially nondepressed subjects were eliminated
on the basis of their DACL scores and were subsequently replaced.
Three of these subjects participated in the neutral-induction condition
but scored higher than 12 on the DACL (they checked no positive

constraint that two words of the same type and question Jist could
not appear consecutively. Last, each block of 10 words on the
recognition list contained two fillers and one word from each com
bination of question list, type of word (homophone vs. nonhomo
phone), and spelling list. Within blocks the words were randomly
ordered with the constraint of no consecutive occurrences of words
from the same question list and spelling list and with a limit of two
consecutive occurrences of homophones.

3 � proper

investigation of mood congruency with homophones

requires that only one meaning be emotional or that the two meanings
have different emotional valences and, furthermore, that the less
common meaning correspond to emotionality in some controllable
way.

�orms

for homophones and emotionality are not sufficiently

extensive for such control, if indeed it is possible.
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adjectives and at least two negative adjectives). The 4 remaining
subjects participated in the depression-induction condition but scored
lower than 6 on the DACL (they checked no negative adjectives and
at least five positive adjectives). In subsequent phone interviews by
Hertel, these 4 subjects aJso said that they were not at aU depressed
by the induction procedure.4
In sum, analyses were performed on the data from 72 subjects, 12
in each of the six combinations of mood and recognition task. The
procedure for counterbalancing question list and spelling list within
each of the six conditions ensured that each word appeared an equal
number of times across subjects as a spelled target, an unspelled
target, a spelled distractor, and an unspelled distractor.5

ment to conditions of recognition. Naturally depressed sub
jects also averaged 12.42 on the DACL.

Spelling
The results of the first spelling test replicated those from
Experiment 1. When the proportions of homophones spelled
in the less common way were submitted to an analysis of
variance, with factors for task (undirected vs. directed), mood
(neutral, induced-depressed, and naturally depressed), and
prior exposure (targets vs. distractors), only the main effect of
prior exposure was reliable, F(l, 66)
17.74, MSe
0.033.
Targets were spelled in line with the questions 50% of the
time by neutral subjects, 48% by subjects with induced depres
sion, and 51% by naturally depressed subjects. The corre
sponding percentages for distractors were 40, 32, and 40.
Across all conditions of mood and task, 50% of targets and
37% of distractors were spelled in line with the questions; this
difference of 13% is similar to the difference of 11% in
Experiment l , although the overall percentages were higher.
This difference was also apparently less than the difference of
27% that was obtained under more analytic conditions for
spelling in Experiment 2, and it therefore suggests that subjects
in Experiment 3 were not attempting to spell in line with the
=

Procedure
We used the procedures from Experiment 2 before the spelling
test, which was administered according to the instructions in Experi
ment 1. After the spelling test, the experimenter consulted the instruc
tions that assigned subjects to either the undirected

or

the directed

recognition task and administered the appropriate test. Procedures
for undirected recognition mimicked those used in Experiment 2.
Instructions for the directed task were as follows:
The next task is a recognition task. I will read another list of
words. Your task will be to decide if each word occurred in the
questions that I asked you in the first task. In order to help you
remember, I will ask you a series of questions. The first question
I will ask is "Was the word on the spelling test?" Please answer
by saying "yes" or "no." If you answer "yes," I will ask you to
remember how you spelled it. If you answer "no," I will ask you
how you would have spelled it. Third, I will ask you if the word
was in the set of questions in the first task and ask you to try to
recall a question with that word in it. If you can, you will know
that the word was in the question phase. Even if you cannot
recall a question, please try to decide if the word occurred in the
question phase.
The recognition task was administered in accordance with those
instructions. For example, if the word was chin, subjects were asked,
"Was the word chin on the spelling test? How did you spell it [or
How would you have spelled it]? Was the word chin on the question
list? What question contained that word?" Subjects responded orally,
and the experimenter recorded all four responses for each word.
After the recognition test, subjects filled out the DACL and were
debriefed. Subjects with induced depression received an elation in
duction. Naturally depressed subjects were asked to fill out the BDI
and ROC forms and deliver them to the office.

=

questions.

Recognition
In this experiment both homophones and nonhomophones
were rotated through all conditions, appearing as targets that
were on the spelling test, targets that were not, distractors that
were on the spelling test, and distractors that were encountered
for the first time on the recognition test. Our first analyses,
then, were performed on all words. They included factors for
task, mood, spelling status (on the spelling test or not), and
type of word (homophone vs. nonhomophone). The depend
ent variable for this analysis was d'.
Directing subjects to use a strategy for recognition improved
their accuracy overall, as indicated by a main effect of task,
F(l, 66)
7.27, MSe
2.140. The mean d's were 1.75 for
undirected subjects and 2.21 for directed subjects. This effect,
however, was attenuated by two interactions: Task x Type of
Word, F(l, 66)
4.62, MSe
0.552, and Task X Spelling
=

=

=

=

Results and Discussion
4

At the request of Trinity University's Internal Review Board,

Mood Indices

Paula Hertel phoned all subjects who underwent an induction of

Scores on the second administration of the BDI averaged
2.40 for initially nondepressed subjects (an upper limit was
set at 5) and did not reliably differ according to assignment
to recognition task or mood induction. The mean for de
pressed subjects was 15.29, with no reliable difference between
recognition conditions.6
Scores on the DACL reflected assignments to mood con
ditions alone, F(2, 6(i)
9.62, MS.
30.780. After we
replaced neutral subjects and subjects with induced depression
according to criteria for the DACL, their mean scores were
6.36 and 12.42, respectively, with no reliable effects of assign-

dissipated by the end of the session. (Only l of 28 said it did not, but
she reported other reasons for feeling tired.) Hertel also asked these

depression in order to determine whether the depressed mood had

=

=

subjects to describe their mood during the experiment and classified
their responses into one of the following categories: nondepressed
(21%), questionable (18%), lethargic (18%), and depressed (43%).
5 One assignment error was made. In the directed condition of
recognition, 4 depressed subjects received Question List B and Spell
ing List 1, whereas 2 depressed subjects received Question List B and
Spelling List 2.
6

Verbal Scholastic Aptitude Test scores were not reliably correlated

with scores on either administration of the BDI, with experimental
conditions, or with measures of spelling and recognition performance.
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Status, F( l , 66) = 5.49,

MS. = 0.640. Mean d's for homo

phones were 1 .53 for undirected subjects and 2. 1 8 for directed
subjects; the corresponding means for nonhomophones were
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Table 2

Mean Proportion ofHits Conditionalized on Spelling Status:
Experiment 3

1 .97 and 2.24. Mean d's for spelled words were 1 .47 (undi

Spelling status

rected) and 2. 1 5 (directed); for unspelled words, they were

2.03 (undirected) and 2.27 (directed}. As these means show,
we also obtained reliable main effects of the type of word,
F( l , 66) = 8. 10,

MS. = 0.552, and spelling status, F( l , 66) =

1 3.04, MS. = 0.640. Viewed as a whole, these results show
that subjects under all mood conditions experienced more
difficulties in undirected recognition, especially for homo
phones and for words from the spelling test.
None of the overall effects involving mood was reliable, but

Recognition task
Undirected
Neutral
Induced depressed
Naturally depressed
Directed
Neutral
Induced depressed
Naturally depressed

n

Biased

Unbiased

Unspelled

12
11

.66
.55
.50

.39-

.46

.38

.46

.57
.53
.68

.60
.32
.26

.58
.54
.54

ll
ll

12
12

.40

.44

there was a trend for naturally depressed subjects to benefit
most from the directions. The average differences in

d' be

tween directed and undirected recognition were .33 (neutral
subjects), .44 (subjects with induced depression), and .62
(naturally depressed subjects).

of the homophones, F(2, 64) = 8.43,

MS.= 0.064; naturally

depressed subjects recognized more homophones that they
had spelled in line with the questions, fewer that they had
spelled in the more common way, a:nd more that they had

Conditionalized Recognition ofHomophonic Targets
In order to examine the more specific effects of directing

not spelled. Their performance was similar to that of neutral
subjects who were undirected in this experiment and in Ex
periment l . 7

the use of a strategy on the recognition of homophonic targets
(as in Experiments 1 and 2), the proportions of homophones
from the question phase that subjects correctly recognized
were submitted to an analysis of variance, with factors for
task (undirected vs. directed), mood (neutral, induced depres
sion, and natural depression), and the status of the homo
phone on the spelling test (spelled in line with the question,
spelled in the more common way, not on the spelling test).
Means are presented in Table 2. Recognition reliably de
pended on the status of the homophone on the spelling test,

Performance on Directed Recognition
The results thus far suggest that our strategy for recognition
produced the expected effects for naturally depressed subjects
only. Their overall accuracy in recognition was most im
proved by our directions, and they were most likely to cor
rectly identify homophonic targets that they had spelled in
line with the questions. Subjects with induced depression also
showed improved accuracy, but requiring them to recall how

F(2, 1 26) = 8.77, MS.= 0.070. But this effect was attenuated
by the marginally reliable three-way interaction, F(4, 1 26) =
1 .99, MS.= 0.070, p < . 1 0.

they had spelled homophones did not increase their recogni

We evaluated this interaction by examining differences

recognizing homophonic targets was changed by those direc

according to spelling status within each combination of mood
and task. Reliable differences obtained for neutral subjects in
the undirected task, F(2, 62)

=

3. 1 6, MS. = 0.076; as we

found in Experiment 1 , neutral subjects recognized targets
most often if they had spelled them in line with the questions.
However, to our surprise, recognition did not depend on
spelling status for neutral subjects in the directed condition.

tion of homophonic targets. Last, neutral subjects' recognition
accuracy was improved by directions, and their pattern of
tions. In particular, their identifications of homophones
spelled in the more common or unbiased way increased. As
a means of understanding the effects of our instructions to
subjects in the directed condition, we conducted analyses of
their responses to the questions used in that task. In the
following sections, we organize descriptions of those analyses

The means show that our directions for recognition elevated
neutral subjects' recognition of homophones that they had
spelled in the more common way. (The results of analyses of
directed recognition are relevant to this finding and are de
scribed in the next section.)
Neither depressed group showed differences according to

7

An analysis of phi coefficients confirmed the trends in analyses

of conditionalized recognition by revealing a reliable interaction of
mood with task, F(2, 60) = 3.90, MS. = . 1 46. The means in the
undirected condition and the directed condition were .32 and -.04
(for neutral subjects), . 1 8 and . 1 8 (for subjects with induced depres

spelling status in the undirected condition. In both conditions

sion), and . 1 5 and .46 (for naturally depressed subjects). Recognition

recognition was independent of spelling. Although there was

depended on how the word had been spelled only when neutral

a trend according to spelling status for the subjects with
induced depression in the directed task, the directions did not
elevate their recognition of homophones spelled in line with
the questions (.53 of the homophones spelled in line with the
questions were recognized by the "induced" subjects in the

subjects were not directed to use our strategy (.32) and when naturally
depressed subjects were so directed (.46).
The interaction of task and mood in analyses of gammas was only
marginally reliable, F(2, 60) = 2.92, MS. = .597, p < .07. Means in
the undirected and directed conditions were .59 and .00 (for neutral
subjects), .36 and .2 1 (for subjects with induced depression), and . 19

directed condition vs . . 55 in the undirected condition). In
contrast, the performance of the naturally depressed subjects

and .73 (for naturally depressed subjects). Again, reliable associations

in the directed task reliably depended on the spelling status

subjects and directed naturally depressed subjects.

of spelling and recognition were found for undirected neutral-mood
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with specific questions: (a) Did subjects remember which

Table 3

homophones they had spelled? (b) Did they remember which

Performance on Directed Recognition: Experiment 3

way they had spelled? (c) Did recognition depend on how

Mood

homophones were spelled in the recognition procedure?

Item

Did subjects remember which homophones they had
spelled? If subjects were confused about which homophones

Neutral

Induced

Depressed

Spelling accuracy

they had spelled earlier, their ability to use the spelling test as
a route to recognition would be impaired. In order to deter

Targets
Distractors

mine whether such confusions differed according to mood,

12

12

n

.81
.92

12

.97

.90
.89

. 92

the proportions of correct responses to the first question in
Proportion correct recognition

the series ("Was the word on the spelling test?") were submit
ted to an analysis of variance. The analysis was restricted to

Biased spelling
Twice
Once
Average
Unbiased spelling
Twice
Once
Average

homophones from the spelling test. Factors included mood,
spelling status (spelled in the less common vs. more common
way on the spelling test), and prior exposure in the questions
(target vs. distractor). No reliable differences were obtained;
the overall mean percentage of hits was 86. (In a separate
analysis, false alarm rates for homophones not on the spelling
test did not differ reliably as a function of mood or prior
exposure; the mean percentage of false alarms was 07.) Thus
differences in directed recognition should not be attributed to
differences in memory for having spelled the words.

Did they remember which way they had spelled? The
second question in the series was "How did you spell the
word?" If subjects could not accurately remember how they

II

n

12

II

.69
.74
.72

.57
.55
.56

.71
.70
.70

.57

.30

.26
.42

.48
.39

.20
. 31
.26

Note. Spelling accuracy refers to the proportion of times that a target

homophone was spelled the same way on the directed recognition
test as it was on the spelling test. Proportion co"ect recognition refers
to the proportion of times that a homophone was correctly recognized
from the questioning phase, contingent on how it had been spelled
(biased or unbiased) on both occasions (twice) or on the recognition
test only (once).

had spelled homophones, they might not be able to profit
from our strategy for recognition. So, in order to reveal
possible differences according to mood, we performed an
analysis of variance on the proportion of homophones from
the spelling task that were spelled again in the same way.

two groups; the interaction of spelling with mood was reliable,

F(2, 3 1 )

=

3.38, MS.

=

0.068.

Last, the three-way interaction was marginally reliable, F(2,

Factors included mood and prior exposure in the questions.

31)

Although the interaction of mood and prior exposure was not

reliably improved by two consistent spellings in the biased or

reliable, the means in the top section of Table 3 show a trend

less common way, in comparison with only one (homophones

for neutral subjects alone to forget how they had spelled

not on the spelling test), regardless of mood. Yet two consist

. 8 1 for targets

ent spellings in the unbiased way did affect recognition differ

vs . 92 for distractors).

ently across conditions of mood, as indicated by a reliable

Did recognition depend on how homophones were spelled
during the recognition procedure? In previous analyses we

interaction of mood with the number of unbiased spellings,

examined recognition conditionalized on how homophones

way was associated with low recognition in the two depressed
groups but with higher recognition by neutral subjects.

homophones from the question phase (Ms

=

.

were spelled on the spelling test. But the data from directed
recognition made it possible to examine recognition condi
tionalized on how homophones were spelled during recogni
tion as well. In the second section of Table 3 we show the

=

2.58, MS.

F(2, 32)

=

=

4.90, MS.

Summary.

0.058, p < . 10. Recognition was not

==

0.085. Spelling twice in the unbiased

Examinations of performance on the separate

steps of the recognition procedure revealed important clues
for understanding how subjects used our strategy for recog

mean proportions of homophonic targets that were recog

nition. First, naturally depressed subjects clearly profited from

nized; these proportions are contingent on how subjects
spelled them on one versus two occasions. Only consistent

our directions. They quite accurately recalled how they had

spellings across the two occasions were included in these
analyses. (The mean number of recognized targets that had
been spelled in both ways was only .33 across all mood

spelled homophones on the spelling test and subsequently
used that information in recognition. In contrast, subjects
with induced depression received less benefit from spelling

groups.)

targets in line with the questions. The benefit was larger when
they had spelled targets twice (.57 for biased spellings vs. .30

The analysis of variance included factors for mood, way of
spelling (less vs. more common), and the number of spelling

for unbiased spellings) than when they had spelled them only
once (.55 vs. .48), but even then the association with spelling

attempts (two when the homophone had been on the spelling
test vs. one if it was spelled only during recognition). Homo

performance was not much greater than for subjects with

.66) were better

vs . .40).
Last, the neutral subjects outfoxed us in the directed rec

phones spelled in the biased way (M

=

recognized regardless of the number of spelling attempts
.36 for unbiased spellings), F( l , 3 1 )
47.23, MS.
(M
0.068. However, spelling in the biased way did not help
subjects with induced depression as much as it did the other
==

=

=

induced depression in the undirected test of recognition (.5 5

ognition task. This task increased the accuracy of recognizing
homophones, but not in the manner that we expected. Instead
of an increase in recognition of targets spelled in line with the
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questions, they showed a n increase i n recognition o f homo

depressed subjects' performance on recognition did not de

phones spelled in the unbiased way on the spelling test. We

pend on whether or how they had spelled the previously

suggest that this tendency can be attributed to a recognition

presented homophones. In contrast, neutral subjects most

strategy that we had not anticipated. Perhaps the request to

frequently recognized tat:gets that they had spelled in line with

recall previous spellings alerted them to think of the alterna

the questions and missed the ones that they had spelled in the

tive meaning and to use it as a route for retrieval. This

more common way. What might they have done, on their

possibility is consistent with their tendency not to remember

own volition, that would lead to such a pattern in their

how they had spelled.

recognition data?

In short, the directed task made recognition more complex

The first locus of possible differences is the questioning

for neutral subjects than for depressed subjects, perhaps be

task. Perhaps neutral subjects noticed homophones embedded

cause neutral subjects were more likely to use both meanings

within the questions. This opportunity for spontaneous proc

of homophones as routes for retrieving questions. Depressed

essing can be de-emphasized because we did not find reliable

subjects showed no evidence of having consulted both mean

effects as a consequence of manipulating mood before the

ings of the homophones on the recognition test. We suspect

questions. Another opportunity for spontaneous processing

that we would have to tell them to do so.

could be taken during the spelling test. Neutral subjects might
have noticed targets from the questioning phase more fre
quently that did depressed subjects. Such awareness, however,

General Discussion

did not affect how they spelled homophones, in view of the

Our account of depressive deficits in processing initiative

fact that spelling performance did not reliably differ according

first anticipates depressive deficits in remembering when the

to mood. But attention to the biased meanings of homo

task encourages spontaneous uses of strategies. In this regard,

phones would serve as a second processing trial for the targets

evidence for deficits in undirected tasks of recognition was

and make them more perspicuous on the recognition test. A

1 and 3: Depressed subjects recog

different explanation of neutral subjects' performance points

produced in Experiments

nized fewer homophones that they had spelled in line with

to strategic processing during recognition. Regardless of their

the questions than did neutral subjects. Furthermore, recog

awareness of targets during spelling, perhaps neutral subjects

nition was independent of spelling for depressed subjects only.

made recognition judgments by recalling how they had spelled

Second, deficits are not expected in tasks in which strategies

homophones and by using the spelled meaning as a route tb

are inappropriate and in tasks in which they are clearly

retrieving the question. Last, some combination of these two

specified by the instructions. Strategies for remembering were

strategies might have produced the neutral-mood advantage

bypassed in the spelling tests of Experiments

1 and 3, and

in recognizing spelled homophones.

deficits were not obtained. A spelling strategy was suggested
in the instructions for Experiment

2 and used by neutral

subjects and subjects with induced depression alike. Last, a
strategy was provided for recognition in Experiment

3. Nat

urally depressed subjects made better use of the strategy than

The Control of Strategies

Spelling strategy.

In Experiment

2 a strategy for spelling

took the form of a suggestion that subjects might be helped

did subjects with induced depression. But the data from

on the spelling test if they thought about the questions. This

neutral subjects suggested that they had found yet another

suggestion elevated the effect of prior occurrence of homo

way to make their recognition judgments. In the following
discussion of Experiments 1 -3, we review the major findings

phones because it turned the test of remembering without
awareness into a test of remembering with awareness. (We did

and relate them to the resource-allocation hypothesis. We

not use control groups to evaluate the size of the effect . of

follow that discussion with a limited review of the literatures

prior occurrence directly, but performance on both spelling

on depressive deficits, with an aim of relating them to an

and recognition tests was substantially better than in the other

initiative perspective.

two experiments.) More to the point, the spelling strategy
dramatically increased recognition conditionalized on spelling

Experiments 1-3

to levels not found in Experiments

1 and 3. All measures of

the association of recognition and spelling performance
showed that subjects with induced depression performed as

Deficits in Initiative

well as neutral subjects. Again, perhaps neutral subjects in

Depressive deficits in recognition have rarely been docu

Experiment 1 had used this strategy spontaneously, noticing
relations to the questions as they spelled the homophones;

mented; in most published experiments, researchers have used

perhaps they did not. Regardless, the strategy was effective in

free recall as the test of memory. Nevertheless, we have shown

reducing the differences between neutral subjects and subjects

some tendency toward depressive deficits in recognizing hom

with induced depression on the recognition test.

ophones. More to the point of these experiments, depressed
subjects showed evidence of eschewing strategies for recogni

Recognition strategy.

Half of the subjects in Experiment

3 were directed to recall whether and how they had spelled

tion that were adopted spontaneously by subjects in a neutral

each word before determining whether the word had occurred

mood.

in a question; they were also asked to recall the question. This

1 and 3, when the instructions did not

strategy improved recognition particularly for homophones

suggest ways of performing the spelling or recognition tasks,

and, independently, for items from the spelling test. For

In Experiments
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naturally depressed subjects, the strategy established strong
dependencies between spelling and recognition, whereas the
improved recognition by neutral subjects under directed in
structions suggested the use of still another strategy that we
had not anticipated: the use of both meanings of the homo
phones as routes for recognition judgments.
Subjects with induced depression had performed as well as
neutral subjects when provided with a spelling strategy in
Experiment 2, but directing them to use a strategy during
recognition did not substantially improve their ability to use
spelling performance as a guide. These different outcomes
imply that noticing the relation between the questions and
the spelling words was a critical requirement for the use of an
effective strategy for recognition. Depression-induced subjects
did remember how they had spelled homophones from the
question phase, but they did not appear to make the connec
tion between homophones on the spelling test and homo
phones in the questions.
In the directed-recognition condition, the connection be
tween spelled and questioned homophones could be made at
two junctures: during spelling or when the subject was asked
to remember a question that contained the spelled word. The
results from the undirected task indicate that neither de
pressed group noticed the connection during the spelling task;
if they had done so, they should have performed as well as
neutral subjects, according to the results of Experiment 2. On
the other hand, the request to recall a question during recog
nition provided a second opportunity to notice the link be
tween the spelled and questioned homophones, but this re
quest was the least constrained step in the procedure for
directed recognition. By implying that subjects might not be
able to recall a question ("Even if you cannot recall a question,
please try to decide if the word occurred in the question
phase"), the instructions permitted the final recognition judg
ments to be made without attempts to recall questions. Why
should subjects whose moods were induced take that "out"
more frequently than would naturally depressed subjects?
The answer to that question should be pursued in future
research. Any account that is based on only one comparison
between the two depressed groups is premature. Here, we
tentatively suggest an approach that emphasizes possible mo
tivational differences. If the mood-induction procedure pro
duced lethargy, these subjects might have expended less effort
in attempting to recall a question. Furthermore, they could
have easily attributed their lack of motivation to the induction
procedure and had a good excuse to expend little effort.
Naturally depressed subjects, in contrast, would less likely
suspect our interest in depression and performance, given that
all measures of depression in these subjects occurred after the
recognition task. And even if they did suspect, they lacked
the convenience of the external attribution; their depression
was a characteristic of self and not of experimental context.
In short, naturally depressed subjects might have been more
motivated to perform well. Last, in proposing these motiva
tional differences, we emphasize that naturally depressed sub
jects' tendency to attempt question recall was not a matter of
initiating a strategy. The strategy was provided. Instead, it was
a matter of motivation to use the provided strategy when it
was not required.

Initiative Versus Resource Allocation

The roots of the resource-allocation account of depressive
deficits are evident in research on naturally depressed popu
lations and populations experiencing depression inductions.
How do our findings inform this account? Clearly, spelling
the words that we used is not an effortful task, and so no
deficit would be expected. When the spelling test was con
verted into a test of memory with awareness in Experiment
2, the degree of effort required to relate the spelling words to
the questions might not have been great enough to challenge
the resources of subjects with induced depression. Yet the
undirected recognition task was intuitively effortful for the
participant; the proportion of affirmative responses to targets
was modest under most conditions, and the intervening spell
ing test added an important source of interference. The re
source-allocation account can easily accommodate the find
ings of deficits in undirected recognition but has greater
difficulty adjusting to the conditions in which the deficits were
eliminated (Experiment 2 and the directed condition of Ex
periment 3). It would be difficult to surmise that directed
recognition was easier, given the requests to recall both spell
ings and questions before the recognition judgments. Al
though we cannot reject this possibility on solid grounds
because we have no independe11t measure of effort, it seems
quite unlikely to us and to the experimenters. Indeed, many
subjects complained that the directed task was frustrating.
In their resource-allocation model, Ellis and Ashbrook
( 1 988) predicted depressive deficits when tasks require greater
degrees of cognitive effort. Our results, however, showed
deficits (or at least differences) when greater effort was not
required but merely possible. This distinction is important.
Whereas Ellis and Ashbrook pointed to decrements in the
effective use of cognitive strategies, they emphasized the re
quirements of the task. We suggest a clearer focus on the
meaning of strategy, which connotes the use of operations
that are not specified or required to do the task. Moreover,
the use of strategies might or might not be effortful, depending
on the degree of their prior practice. Even the selection of a
strategy could be made somewhat automatically, given its
frequent use under similar circumstances. Clearly, the useful
ness of both the resource-allocation hypothesis and the initi
ative hypothesis depends on the development of these distinc
tions in further research.
Much of the evidence in support of the resource-allocation
hypothesis was accrued from mood-induction procedures.
Perhaps these procedures produce effects that differ from the
cognitive concomitants of natural depression. Earlier, we
interpreted such differences within a motivational framework.
Although it is possible that inductions produce greater deple
tions or reallocations of resources than do those accompany
ing natural depression-that the induced mood is more in
tense (see Ellis, 1 985)-our postexperimental interviews and
the results from the DACL fail to confirm this hypothesis.
But we wish to emphasize above all else the importance of
comparing these two types of depressive moods in future
research. If similarities are found, the manipulation of mood
can reduce the ambiguity associated with the multifaceted
syndrome of depression (see Ellis, 1 985).

DEPRESSIVE MEMORY

Relation to the Literature on Depressive Deficits

The literature on depressive deficits in remembering con
tains (a) research on mood and memory in which depressive
moods have been experimentally induced, (b) studies of the
association of memory performance with scores on self-report
instruments such as the BDI, and (c) memory research in
which depressed patients served as subjects. In the following
sections, we describe research selected from each of those
categories and research on depression in literatures outside
the concern with memory. Our purpose is to show that an
initiative account of depressive deficits is consistent with a
wide range of prior research.
Mood Inductions

Ellis and his students have provided the bulk of knowledge
concerning deficits caused by the induction of depressed
moods. In the first of such studies, Leight and Ellis ( 1981)
demonstrated deficits in the learning of strategies for recalling
letter strings. In one condition (varied input), the learning
task encouraged but did not instruct for the discovery of
higher order meaning in letter strings. However, in the con
stant-input condition, such discovery was made more diffi
cult, and learning was consequently retarded. After several
study-recall trials with one list of items, subjects were trans
ferred to a similar second task, under either varied or constant
conditions. The important result for our purposes was that
subjects who experienced a neutral mood and received varied
input on the learning task detected the higher order meaning
and transferred that strategy to the second task, regardless of
their mood or the conditions of input during the second task.
However, if subjects were depressed before the learning task,
transfer performance was always worse. In a manner consist
ent with an initiative account, a depressed mood prevented
the detection of the optimal strategy, but once this strategy
was discovered under neutral conditions, depressed subjects
used it effectively.
In later studies in Ellis's laboratory, a possible relation
between depressed mood and the failure to use strategies could
be merely inferred from the lack of constraint in their proc
essing tasks. For example, Ellis et al. ( 1 984, Experiment 3)
found a depression-related deficit in free recall after an inci
dental semantic processing task. In each processing trial,
neutral subjects and subjects experiencing mood inductions
were asked to choose a word that sensibly completed a sen
tence. The incomplete sentence varied according to its diffi
culty of completion. An unexpected test of free recall was
administered after the processing task and revealed a depres
sive deficit for words chosen for the more difficult sentences
but not for words chosen for the easy ones. To Ellis et al.,
these results indicated that depressed subjects possessed insuf
ficient resources to perform well under more difficult proc
essing conditions. From our perspective, the subjects seemed
capable making those more difficult decisions (i.e., "Does the
word dream fit into He was awakened by the frightening
?"); the error rate was low. We suggest that depressed
subjects might not have attended carefully to the materials
beyond making the decision. The procedures were sufficiently
__
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relaxed that they would be susceptible to attentional strategies
spontaneously elected by subjects in a neutral mood.
Last, there are a few reports of failures to find depressive
deficits with induction procedures. Ellis and Lane (cited by
Ellis, 1 985) found no decrements in the recall of generated
words. The generating procedure might constrain processing
to the degree that other strategies would not occur to nonde�
pressed subjects. Bower, Gilligan, and Monteiro ( 1 98 1) and
Einstein and Ellis (cited by Ellis & Ashbrook, 1 988) failed to
find depressive deficits in recalling stories or expository text.
Such failures suggest that texts provided depressed subjects
with sufficient structure or that nondepressed subjects might
not have developed special strategies for remembering texts
and therefore failed to show an advantage over the depressed
subjects. These suggestions for how previous research on
mood inductions can be viewed from an initiative perspective
are quite tentative. But they do offer directions for future
investigations.
Naturally Depressed Students

Hasher and Zacks ( 1 979) were perhaps the first investigators
to propose that depressive deficits emerge primarily in effort
ful processing tasks. In their Experiment 4, depressed and
nondepressed college students (categorized by BDI scores)
performed an incidental semantic task, followed by recogni
tion. The depressed subjects made fewer associative errors in
recognition, which indicates that they processed the target
words less elaboratively on the incidental task. As the authors
suggested, low levels of elaboration might be attributed to a
reduction in cognitive capacity. Yet the lack of associative
errors might also reflect reduced initiative to go beyond the
requirements of their incidental task.
In later work, Hasher, Rose, Zacks, Sanft, and Doren ( 1 985)
assessed depression in college students in a number of ways,
including the BDI, and found no depressive deficits in the
recall of stories. They concluded that studying stories of the
type that they used is perhaps a task that is not difficult
enough to show effort-related deficits. It may also be the case
that studying those stories was not as susceptible to the
spontaneous use of uninstructed strategies as are other tasks,
and so the lack of a deficit would reflect a lack of initiative
on the part of the nondepressed subjects.
Little research with naturally depressed college students has
produced clear evidence of depressive deficits, and occasion
ally evidence of a depressive advantage has been recorded (see
Hasher et al., 1 985). Such an advantage in free recall was
found by Hertel and Rude ( 1 989), who attempted to replicate
the results of Ellis et al. ( 1 984, Experiment 3) with naturally
depressed students rather than students with induced depres
sion and with a more tightly constrained processing task. The
target was displayed for 1 s only and was reported by the
subjects at the end of the 8-s sentence display. Also, during
these trials, a brief and slightly audible tone typically sounded.
The subject's primary task was to decide whether the word fit
sensibly into the sentence, and the secondary task was to press
a button as soon as possible in response to the tone. The
secondary tone-detection task served as a probe for the
amount of available effort; longer latencies to respond to the
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tone were offered as indices that fewer resources were available

ruminations. Thus allocation of capacity might be better

or that more resources were allocated to the primary task (see

understood as controlled by task demands, rather than con

Tyler et al.,

1 979). The dependent measures in this experiment

sistently hampered by depression.

were the median latencies to respond to the probe for cognitive
effort and the number of words produced on the unexpected
test of free recall.

Other Research on Depression

Depressed subjects took reliably longer to respond to the

Outside the literature on memory, there are numerous

tone than did nondepressed subjects. At first blush, their

references to depressive deficits in initiative. Retarded initia

longer reaction times might indicate that depression limited

tion of voluntary action serves as the motivational component

the amount of available resources and consequently post

in learned helplessness models of depression (see Abramson,

1 978). For example, Abramson, Alloy,
( 198 1 ) found depressive deficits in generating

poned responses to the probe. One competing explanation for

Seligman, & Teasdale,

the longer latencies concerns possible motor retardation as

and Rosoff

sociated with depression, but it was eliminated in a subsequent

hypotheses for solving complex problems, but the deficits

experiment. A third and more compelling explanation rests

disappeared when a list of hypotheses was provided by the

on the results of the free-recall test: Depressed subjects actually

experimenter. In reviews of learned helplessness research and

( 1 983) and
( 1 982) related lack of initiative to deficits in self

recalled reliably higher percentages of items than did nonde

other models of depression, Coyne and Gotlib

pressed subjects. The similar patterns in latencies and recall

Rehm

suggest that depressed subjects' capacity was allocated to the

monitoring and self-control.

primary task, rather than being limited by depression. More
over, processing words in the more difficult contexts produced
longer latencies and better memory in

both

groups. These

results obviously failed to show the deficit that was obtained
by Ellis et al.

( 1 984) when depression was induced. Why?

Self-monitoring, according to Stuss and Benson

( 1 986), is

one of the activities of the prefrontal lobes, which are impli
cated in "nonroutine, novel situations that require new solu
tions" (p.

244). Frontal lobe functions are also loosely related
( 1 983) and Schacter

to depression. Damasio and Van Hoesen

Possible explanations are related to differences between in

( 1 987) reviewed evidence for a link between frontal lobe

duced and natural depression and to different degrees of

damage, affective disturbance, and problems in planning,

constraint in the processing task, but further research must

initiation, and maintenance of action. In short, neuropsycho

resolve those issues.

logical research points to an area of the brain, the prefrontal

Depression Measured by Diagnostic Criteria

processing initiative. But the possibility of such a linkage must

region, that is implicated in depression and in deficits in

Clinicians have suggested caution in interpreting results
from studies in which self-reported measures of depression

be cautiously considered because the work is correlational
and because many of the functions of the frontal lobes are
served by other areas (Mayeux,

1 983).

(such as the BDI) are used without accompanying diagnostic
procedures, because the BDI was not designed for diagnostic
purposes (see Depue & Monroe,

1 978). In this light, Hertel

Directions and Implications

( 1 989) interviewed their subjects and selected those

In a set ofthree experiments, we have sought to demonstrate

who met research diagnostic criteria for depression. Yet the

the usefulness of a focus on initiative for understanding

and Rude

majority of memory investigations with carefully screened

depressive deficits in remembering. The experiments included

depressed subjects have been conducted with patients or

conditions for spontaneous, bypassed, and directed use of

outpatients who are not college students (see the review by

strategies within the context of spelling and recognition tests.

Johnson & Magaro,

1 987).

Future research should be designed to explore the usefulness

The work of Weingartner and his associates dominates this

of an initiative account in other memory paradigms and

category of research on memory deficits. In a frequently cited

attempt a more precise specification of the nature of the

set of experiments with hospitalized depressed subjects and

deficit, relating it to motivational accounts of depression.

control subjects, Weingartner, Cohen, Murphy, Martello, and

Last, an emphasis on deficits in initiative might have useful

Gerdt ( 198 1 ) manipulated the inherent and apparent organi

implications for the treatment of depression. Knowing that

zation of a list of words to be recalled. They obtained clear

depressed people can expend cognitive effort in processing

evidence that depressed subjects poorly detected, constructed,

tasks but often lack the initiative to do so, we might recom

or used organization in list learning, but it is unclear whether

mend that they engage in well-structured tasks instead of

they suffered the loss of capacity for organizing or the loss of
initiative (also see Russell & Beekhuis,

1 976).

In a more direct examination of capacity issues, Krames
and MacDonald

( 1 985) used a highly structured dual-proc

essing task with varying degrees of cognitive load. Their results

resigning them to function on low capacity. The therapeutic
advantage is a short circuit in the spiral of depression: Well
structured tasks serve as distractions from depressive musings,
and success in these tasks should produce therapeutic feelings
of competence.

support an initiative hypothesis because they showed that
depressed outpatients recalled more words from the beginning
of the list under high loads than under low loads, but the
reverse was true for the nondepressed outpatients. Krames
and MacDonald concluded that as task-relevant demands
increase, depressed people allocate less attention to depressive
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